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TAKING BACK OUR STREETS:
ATTEMPTS IN THE 104TH CONGRESS
TO REFORM THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
At five o'clock in the morning on April 25, 1995, Officer Richard
Carroll, a ten year veteran of the New York Police Department, pa-
trolled the intersection of 176th Street and Amsterdam, part of his
regular be.sh in an area known as a "hub for the drug trade."' In the
course of his duty, Officer Carroll observed a double-parked, rented
car with Michigan license plates. 2 With his suspicions aroused, Officer
Carroll looked closer and observed four males open the trunk of the
car and throw in two black duffle bags.' The individuals spotted the
squad car and quickly scattered.4
The suspicious car then pulled away from the curb and headed
for an entrance ramp to a highway.' Officer Carroll, acting in apparent
good faith on a belief that the situation produced reasonable suspicion,
pulled the car over before it could merge onto the highway.' While
searching the car's trunk, Officer Carroll found ninety pounds of
cocaine and heroin, estimated at a street value of four million dollars,
in the black duffle bags.' In a videotaped confession, the driver, Carol
Bayless, admitted that she picked up the drugs to bring to her son in
Detroit!
Later, at a pre-trial hearing, Judge Harold Baer, Jr.—despite the
out-of-state plates on a rented car, the fact that the car was double-
parked, the time and the location of the incident and the fleeing of
the four men at the mere sight of the squad car—ruled that Officer
Carroll did not have the reasonable suspicion necessary to detain Ms.
Bayless or the probable cause to search the car and bags.' As a result,
Judge Baer suppressed the ninety pounds of drugs and the videotaped
confession from use at trial.m The Unites States Attorney's office stated
I See Deborah Pines, Drugs Suppressed Due to improper Stop, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 24, 1996, at 1; AN,
Rosenthal, Arrogance of Judges Sabotage Safe Streets, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Jan. 31, 1996 at A4;
The Drug Judge, WALL. Sr. J., Jan. 26, 1996 at A10.





7 See Rosenthal, supra note 1, at A9.
8 See id.
See Pines, supra note 1, at I.
10
 See The Drug Judge, supra note 1, at A10. In ruling that Officer Carroll lacked probable
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that, unless the appeals court reversed the ruling, the prosecution
lacked sufficient evidence to continue to prosecute Bayless.'
The exclusionary rule generally requires a court to exclude evi-
dence obtained through illegal means from consideration at tria1. 12
Over eighty years ago, in Weeks v. United States, the Supreme Court
created this remedy as method of enforcing the Fourth Amendment's
prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. 13 Courts con-
tinue to apply this doctrine today, although the Supreme Court has
carved out numerous exceptions to the exclusionary rule's applica-
tion.' 4
 Because of its potential outcome-determinative effect as well as
its alleged role as the keystone in the bulwark protecting civil liberties,
many commentators view the exclusionary rule as the most crucial
principle in constitutional criminal procedure. 15
In the Bayless situationjudge Baer relied on the exclusionary rule
to prohibit the use of the drugs as evidence at trial because he deter-
mined that Officer Carroll's search violated the Fourth Amendment. 16
Because Officer Carroll did not obtain a warrant, the judge must de-
termine that there existed probable cause for his search to be proper.'?
Since judge Baer determined that probable cause did not exist, Officer
Carroll did not obtain the drugs legally and thus the prosecution could
not use them as evidence at trial.is
cause, Judge Baer reasoned that "[r)esidents in this neighborhood tend to regard police officers
as corrupt, abusive and violent" Id. So, according to the court, "had the men not run when the
cops began to stare at them it would have been unusual." Id. Commentators directed much
criticism at Judge Baer's determination that Officer Carroll lacked probable cause to conduct the
search. See Rosenthal, supra note 1, at A4; The Drugfudge, supra note 1, at A10. In the subsequent
uproar, Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, who had recommended Baer for the federal bench,
offered an interesting response—the judge should be sentenced to live a year in Washington
Heights to see if he would run away whenever he saw police. Rosenthal, supra note I, at A10.
President Clinton rejected a request by Republicans in the House of Representatives to seek the
resignation of Judge Baer, who Clinton had appointed. Clinton Rebuffs G.O.P.'s Request on Judge,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 1996 at Al 1. Clinton, however, indicated that he would request the Justice
Department to appeal the decision. Id. Under this considerable pressure, Judge Baer ultimately
reversed his ruling and admitted both the drugs and videotaped confession. fudge. Assailed Over
Drug Case Issues Reversal and an Apology, N.Y. Tistrs, April 2, 1996 at Al.
" The DrugJudge, supra note 1, at A10.
12 See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914).
13
 See id.
14 See generally Arizona v. Evans, 115 S. Ct. 1185 (1995).
15
 Senator Biden, for example, was quoted as saying, `Ulf a bill were going to pass with either
a limited death penalty or an attack on the exclusionary rule, I'd rather take out the weakening
of the exclusionary rule .. .." Nat Hentoff, Repealing the Fourth Amendment, WASH. POST, Oct.
8, 1988, at A27.
16 See Weeks, 232 U.S. at 393.
17 See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S, i 32, 149 (1925). To conduct the intrusive search For
reasons beyond ensuring Officer Carroll's safety, there must have existed probable cause. See id.
18 See Pines, supra note 1 , at I. In order to detain Bayless long enough to conduct an
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The general public has consistently and resoundly criticized the
exclusionary rule.'" Many people view the suppression of tainted evi-
dence as a mere technicality that obstructs the pursuit of justice. 2°
Interestingly, this issue eludes easy ideological labels as both liberals
and conservatives can find themselves joining together on either side
of the debate. 2 '
The public concern with the exclusionary rule, as well as the
existing crime problem, has not gone unnoticed by the courts. 22 In the
thirty years since the Supreme Court extended the exclusionary rule
to state law enforcement, the Court has regularly reconsidered whether
"the criminal should go free if the constable has blundered." 23 Such
examinations have led to the creation of numerous exceptions to the
exclusionary rule's application, one of the most significant being the
creation of a "good faith" exception for searches under a warrant in
United States v. Leon."
Congress, too, has noticed the public dissatisfaction with the ex-
clusionary rule and, as a result, has often attempted to either replace
it or sharply curtail its application. 2' These efforts result, in part, from
an attempt to answer the call issued by Chief Justice Burger in his
dissent in Bivens v. Six Unnamed Agents for Congress to replace the
exclusionary rule with a more appropriate remedy. 26 An additional mo-
tivation undoubtedly derives from traditional political concerns with
issues relating to crime.27
investigation, Officer Carroll needed only reasonable suspicion. See generally Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1 (1968).
12
 Senator Bidet] predicted that, if offered up for a vote, the Fourth Amendment would be
rejected today. See Federal Crime Control Priorities: Hearings of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 104th
Cong. (1995) [hereinafter Federal Crime Control].
20
 See Potter Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Development and
Future of the Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 CoLum. L. REY. 1365, 1393 (1983).
21
 See Nat tlentaf, Say Goodbye to the Fourth Amendment, SACRAMENTO BEE, Feb, 6, 1995, at.
B6. Conservative Representative Henry Hyde and liberal Representative Barney Frank both
recently voted to curtail the exclusionary rule's application. See id. Justice Clarence Thomas
appears to be a stronger proponent of the exclusionary rule than do Justices Sower and Breyer.
See Clarence Thomas Supreme Court Nomination: Hearing of the. Senate Judiciary COMM., FED. NEWS
SERVICE, Sept. 12, 1991; Hearing of the Senate Judiciary Comm.: Confirmation Hearing of fudge
David Smiler to the Supreme Court, FED. Nrms SERVICE, Sept. 14, 1990; Supreme Court Confirmation
Hearing for Judge Stephen G. Breyer: Hearing of the Senate Judiciary COMM., FED. NEWS Smtv., July
1, 1994.
22 See, e.g., Evans, 115 S. Ct. at 1193; United States v. Leon, 468 U.S, 897, 922 (1984).
23
 People v, Delare, 242 N.Y. 13, 21 (1926); see infra notes 80-153 and accompanying text.
24 See 468 U.S. at 922.
25 Measures to repeal or curtail the exclusionary rule have been introduced in the last five
Congresses. See infra note 156 and accompanying text.
28 403 U.S. 388, 422-23 (1971) (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
27 See infra note 30 and accompanying text.
208	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 38:205
In 1995, both the Senate and the House of Representatives offered
bills to amend or repeal the exclusionary rule. 28
 These proposals rep-
resent, in part, Congress's response to the intolerable existing crime
rate, the increasingly violent nature of modern crime and the almost
universal agreement of the American public that the federal govern-
ment should make this problem an absolute priority. 29 Because of the
deep public concern with this situation, politicians on both sides of the
aisle have attempted to take stronger stances on crime. 5"
By analyzing the reforms to the exclusionary rule proposed in the
104th Congress, this Note will discuss the creation and expansion of
that rule, the evolution of its underlying policies and the expansion of
the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. This Note proposes
that Congress create an exception to the exclusionary rule for all
searches, either with or without a warrant, carried out in objective good
faith by federal law enforcement officials. Part I of this Note will
examine the Court's creation of the exclusionary rule and the early
evolution of its application and rationale. 81
 Part II will discuss the
continuing evolution of the justifications for the exclusionary rule and
the resulting cutbacks in its application. 82 Part III will examine the
various proposals offered in the 104th Congress pertaining to the
28 See H.R. 666, 104th Cong. (1995); S. 3, 104th Cong. (1995); S. 54, 104th Cong. (1995); S.
1495, 104th Cong. (1995). In the 104th Congress, measures to limit or repeal the exclusion-
ary rule were introduced by Representative McCollum of Florida in the House and Senators
Robert Dole of Kansas, Strom Thurmond of South Carolina and jon Kyl or Arizona in the Senate.
See id.
29 See Federal Crime Control, supra note 19. F131 Director Louis Freeh testified that from 1960
through 1993, the number of violent crimes reported in America increased 567%. See id. The
number of violent crimes reported increased 51% in the period just from 1985 to 1995. See id.
Although the crime rate dropped slightly in 1992 and 1993 by 3.1%, most commentators feel that
this drop is only a minor fluctuation rather than any significant lasting downturn. See id. Such a
position is bolstered by the (1% increase in the number of juveniles arrested for violent crimes.
See id. Ominously, studies indicate that this group will be the fastest growing and largest age group
by the year 2000 and, thus, the number of people involved in crime in this age group can be
expected to increase if trends continue. See Federal Crime Control, supra note 19. Finally, Freeh
testified that a survey showed that 93% of those polled felt that addressing America's crime
problem should be an absolute priority of the federal government. See id.
30 See Nancy Mathis, GOP Launches Anti-Crime Package, S.F. EXAMINER, Feb. 9, 1995 at A17.
An attempt to expand the good faith exception to warrantless searches passed in the House of
Representatives by an overwhelming margin of 289-142. See id. In addition, the House voted
297-132 to approve a bill that would restrict the number of federal death penalty appeals by
convicted murderers to one. See id. Despite the constitutional issues raised by such measures,
President Clinton focused his efforts on other matters in an attempt to ensure that Congress
appropriated adequate funds to provide aid to the states for the purposes of funding 100,000
new local police officers. See id.
51 See infra notes 35-79 and accompanying text.
52 See infra notes 80-153 and accompanying text.
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exclusionary rule." Part IV will examine the need for correction of the
exclusionary rule and offer a proposal for congressional reform."
I. THE ORIGINS AND EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF THE
EXCLUSIONARY RULE
The right of the people to be secure in their person, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrant shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to he searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
The Fourth Amendment, incorporated to apply to the states by
the Supreme Court's reading of the Fourteenth Amendment, limits
government intrusions on individual privacy by requiring that all
searches and seizures be reasonable." A warrant issued upon probable
cause most easily satisfies the reasonableness requirement." Although
it creates the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures,
the Fourth Amendment offers no remedies for violations of its coin-
mands.37 Thus, the Amendment differs greatly from the Fifth Amend-
ment, which explicitly creates both a right and a remedy." Despite the
oddity of the notion of a right without a remedy, the Supreme Court
on several occasions has recognized that the Constitution does not
require the creation of a remedy for every constitutional wrong."
For more than the first one hundred years of our nation's history,
federal courts did not require the exclusion of probative, though
illegally obtained, evidence from trial.° Rather, courts simply did not
8.7
	 infra notes 154-225 and accompanying text.
81 See infra notes 226-92 and accompanying text.
5• See Mapp v. Ohio, 357 U.S. 543, 655 (1961).
86 See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 914 (1984).
" See id. at 906.
38
 U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Supreme Court has noted that the Fifth Amendment contains
a direct command against the admission of compelled testimony, while the court determines the
admissibility of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment after, and apart from,
ruling on a constitutional violation, See United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 443 (1976).
89 See, e.g., Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 306-07 (1989) (restriction on use of federal habeas
corpus actions for purpose of making new law); Leon, 468 U.S. at 919-20 (no remedy for good
tidal errors in search warrant process); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 806 (1982) (growth
of qualified immunity doctrine). For more on this area, see Exclusionary Rule Reform of H.R. 666:
Subcomm. on Crime of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. (1995) (statement of Paul
Larkin, Jr.).
911 See WAYNE LAFAVE & JERROLD ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 105 (3d. ed. 1992).
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inquire into the means employed in obtaining evidence and thus did
not engage in a Fourth Amendment analysis. 41 In 1886, however, the
United States Supreme Court in Boyd v. United States held that the
forced disclosure of papers violated the Fourth Amendment, and such
items therefore became inadmissible at judicial proceedings: 12 In Boyd,
the police, in the course of investigating smuggling, demanded and
obtained the invoice of the goods in question. 43 Because the police
request compelled the suspect to surrender private and incriminating
documents, the Court analyzed the case by linking the Fourth Amend-
ment to the Fifth Amendment, which contains an explicit exclusionary
remedy." Thus, the Boyd Court reasoned that the use of illegally ob-
tained evidence did not differ from compelling witnesses to testify
contrary to their interests. 45 For apparently the first time, therefore,
the Court used the Fourth Amendment, in part, to exclude incrimi-
nating evidence from trial. 46
The Supreme Court soon thereafter, however, moved away from
this approach and again declined to inquire into the means employed
by law enforcement officers in obtaining evidence. 47 In 1904, in Adams
v. New York, the Supreme Court held that courts, in determining
admissibility, should examine the competency of the evidence rather
than the method used to obtain the evidence." In Adams, the police
raided the suspect's apartment and seized illegal gambling slips. 49 The
Court, holding the illegal seizure irrelevant for purposes of determin-
ing admissibility, permitted the admission of the gambling slips as
evidence at trial." The Adams Court, therefore, refused to exclude
evidence when its seizure implicated only the Fourth Amendment. 51
It was not until 1914, in Weeks v. United States, that the United
States Supreme Court imposed the exclusionary rule on federal law
enforcement by holding that the Fourth Amendment prohibited fed-
eral officials from submitting illegally obtained evidence at trial. 52 In
41 See id.
42 1 16 U.S. 616, 638 (1886).
43 Id. at 617- 18.
44 Id. at 621.
45 See id. at 621-22.
46 See id.
47 See Adams v, New York, 192 U.S. 585, 594 (1904).
48 Id.
49 Id. at 587.
59 Id. at 594.
51 See id.
52 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914).
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Weeks, local police officers entered the suspect's house without a war-
rant and seized personal papers.55
 Later that day, a United States
Marshall, also without a warrant, entered the home and seized addi-
tional evidence. 54
 The Court reasoned that providing a remedy for the
invasion of the suspect's home required the exclusion of the illegally-
obtained evidence." In addition, the Court also stated that federal
agents who committed constitutional violations "should find no sanc-
tion in the judgments of the courts which are charged at all times with
the support of the Constitution and to which people of all condi-
tions have a right to appeal for the maintenance of such fundamental
rights."56
 The Supreme Court, thus, commanded the judiciary to avoid
the taint that results from permitting the use of the fruits of an illegal-
ity.57
 This concept became known as 'judicial integrity." 58 At the same
time, the Weeks Court refused to apply this remedy to victims of state
action, and thus admitted the evidence seized by the local police
officers.59
 Following Weeks, therefore, in the federal law enforcement
system, courts would suppress illegally seized evidence due to the dual
justifications of preserving judicial integrity and remedying constitu-
tional wrongs.°
Because the Court based the exclusionary rule on the concept of
judicial integrity as opposed to a specific Constitutional provision, the
Court did not at first impose the exclusionary rule upon state law
enforcement. 61
 It soon, therefore, became common practice for local
officers to seize evidence employing methods forbidden to federal
officials. 62
 These local officers would then turn such evidence over to
federal officials "on a silver platter" to assist in the federal prosecution
of a suspect.°
In 1949, in Wolf v. Colorado, the United States Supreme Court had
a chance to bring the "silver platter" practice to a halt by extending the
exclusionary remedy to the states. 64 The Court in Wolf, while applying
53 Id. at 386.
54 See id.
55 See id. at 393.
56 Id. at 392.
57 See Weeks, 232 U.S. at 392.
55 See Elkins v, United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960).
59 Weeks, 232 U.S. at 398.
69 See id.
6 ' See Elkins, 364 U,S. at 216,
62 See id. at 207 n.1,
85 See id,
SA!. 338 U.S. 25, 33 (1949).
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the Fourth Amendment to the states, held that the states remained free
to select their own method of enforcing the Fourth Amendment. 65 In
Wolf the Supreme Court reviewed the prosecution of a state crime
conducted in a state court." Because of these facts, combined with
Article III limitations on the Court's supervisory power, the Supreme
Court refrained from suppressing the evidence at issue.° The Wolf
Court, therefore, limited the preservation of judicial integrity to the
federal courts." After Wolf, the Court thus applied the Fourth Amend-
ment to the states but permitted the states to select their own method
for enforcing it.°'
Following the decision in My; the Supreme Court, with one
exception, addressed few cases regarding the exclusionary rule."' In
the one case that did involve tainted evidence, however, the Court
added a third justification for applying the exclusionary rule: deter-
rence of illegal government activity. 7 ' In Elkins v. United States, the
Court barred federal courts from admitting evidence illegally obtained
by state or local officers. 72 In so ruling, the Court reasoned that per-
mitting the use of such evidence would create an indefensible distinc-
tion between the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments." The Court,
thus, put an end to the "silver platter" doctrine." More importantly for
purposes of precedent, the Court added deterrence to the policy
reasons underlying the exclusionary rule." After Elkins, therefore, the
United States Supreme Court identified three justifications for the
exclusionary rule—its remedial effect, its preservation of judicial in-
tegrity and its deterrent effect.
In 1961, in Mapp v. Ohio, one of the Warren Court's most impor-
tant and controversial decisions, the United States Supreme Court held
that the exclusionary rule extended to include state law enforcement
activities. 76 In Mapp, police officers, searching for a bombing suspect,
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 See id. Article 111 limitations on the supervisory power prevent the Court from imposing
on state courts evidentiary rules beyond those required by the Constitution. See Elkins, 364 U.S.
at 216.
6s See Wolf 338 U.S at 31.
69 Id. at 33.
76 See Elkins, 304 U.S. at 217.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 223.
" Id. at 215, 223.
74 See id. at 223.
75 Elkins, 364 U.S. at 217.
76 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
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broke into a suspect's home and seized personal items and papers. 77 A
plurality desired to exclude the evidence on the grounds that the
exclusionary rule actually constituted part of the Fourth Amendment
and thus limited state activity. 78
 Such an idea, however, never received
the vote of a majority. Instead, the Court, in excluding the materials
from trial, repeated the traditional triumvirate of justifications—the
remedial effect, the deterrent effect and the preservation of judicial
integrity—as the basis for excluding the illegally obtained evidence. 7"
The Mapp decision would mark the high-water point of the exclusion-
ary rule's application.
II. EVOLUTION OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE'S RATIONALE
AND THE RESULTING CUTBACKS
Only four years after its historic holding, criticism of Mapp led the
Supreme Court to curtail the application of the exclusionary rules"
The trio of justifications for the exclusionary rule slowly began to
dissolve into a single justification—deterrence. 81
 By gradually reducing
the exclusionary rule to the question of whether its application would
prevent future wrongful police conduct, an increasingly conservative
Court began to curtail the scope of the rule's application. 82 Such
limitations, in turn, soon justified further limitations in a self-perpetu-
ating cycle."
The process of curtailing the application of the exclusionary rule
began almost immediately after Mapp.84 In
 1965,OD in Linkletter v. Walker,
the United States Supreme Court held that the decision in Mapp did
not apply retroactively and went on to attack one of the justifications
Mapp offered for the exclusionary rule—that courts must apply the
exclusionary rule as a remedy for a constitutional wrong." In Linkletter,
77 Id. at 644-45.
78 /d. at 657. Justice Clark wrote, "Moreover, our holding that the exclusionary rule is an
essential part of both the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments is not only the logical dictate of
prior cases, but n also makes very good sense." Id.
" See id. at 660.
sa See Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 640 (1965) (rejecting retroactivity of holding in
Mapp).
al See United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 458 n.35 (1976).
82
 See, e.g., Arizona v. Evans, 115 S. Ct. 1185, 1193 (1995); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S.
897, 922 (1984).
83
 See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974); Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 640.
84 See Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 640.
83 See id. al 637. Notably, Justice Clark, the author of this opinion, also wrote the plurality
opinion in Mapp. Compare id. at 618 with Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
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state police, acting prior to the ruling in Mapp, searched a suspect's
home without a warrant after imprisoning the defendant. 86 The Court
upheld the prosecution's use of the subsequently discovered evidence,
reasoning that because the suppression of the evidence would not in
any way restore the privacy disrupted by the governmental intrusion,
suppression would result in only a negligible gain to the defendant's
due process rights. 87 Therefore, shortly after the exclusionary rule had
been imposed on the states, the Linkletter Court questioned one of the
stated rationales for that rule."
Although the Court began to give less weight to remedial effects
in deciding when to apply the exclusionary rule, it increased the
importance of the deterrent effect as a justification for that rule." For
instance, in 1967, in Alderman v. United States, the United States Su-
preme Court limited standing in petitions for suppression of evidence
to only those who were actual victims of an illegal search." In Alderman,
the Court refused to grant standing to third party victims of an illegal
wiretap. 9 ' The Court reached this result by emphasizing that further
extension of the rule to third parties would produce only a minimal
increase in deterrence of illegal police activity."
In addition to this increased reliance on the justification of deter-
rence, the Court also classified illegal searches as a lesser constitutional
wrong." In 1967, in Chapman v. California, the Supreme Court held
that, in some instances, courts may declare the improper admission of
illegally obtained evidence "harmless."94
 In Chapman, the Court ex-
cluded from trial evidence of a suspect's failure to testify, refusing to
label such evidence as harmless." In deciding to suppress this evi-
dence, however, the Court distinguished between evidence obtained
through certain violations of the Fifth Amendment, which must always
result in suppression, with evidence obtained through Fourth Amend-
ment violations, which need not be suppressed if the court deems the
ar Linkletier, 381 U.S. at 621.
87 1d. at 636-37.
88 see id.
89 SeeAlderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174-75 (1969).
90 Id. at 175-76.
91 Id.
92 Id. at 174-75.
95 See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 (1967).
94 Id.
95 Id. at 19-20.
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admission harmless. 9" The Chapman Court, therefore, indirectly began
to soften the hard-and-fast rule established in Mapp. 97
Some federal courts of appeals, noticing the Supreme Court's
increased emphasis on deterrence, used this opportunity to further
limit the application of the exclusionary rule.`'" In United States v.
Schipani, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
permitted the admission of illegally obtained evidence at sentencing
hearings."`' In Schipani, the sentencing judge based his sentence, in
part, on information obtained from excluded wiretaps.m In upholding
this sentence, the court reasoned that a second application of the
exclusionary rule would not add in any significant way to the deterrent
effect achieved by initially suppressing the evidence at trial.°° Similarly,
in 1975, in United States v. Vandemark, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit applied this same reasoning to permit
the admission of illegally obtained evidence at probation hearings.' 02
Both of these rulings resulted from the greater importance given to
deterrence by the Supreme Court. 10"
In 1974, the United States Supreme Court clearly rejected the
argument that the Fourth Amendment mandates the suppression of
illegally obtained evidence.Hm In United States v. Calandra, the Court
upheld the constitutionality of admitting illegally obtained evidence
at grand jury proceedings. 105 In Calandra, the prosecution sought to
admit evidence seized in a search that exceeded the scope authorized
by the warrant at a grand jury proceeding. 106 In permitting the admis-
sion of this evidence, the Court reasoned that the suppression of such
evidence would not serve to deter illegal police activity. 107 In addition,
the Court clearly stated that, contrary to the suggestion in Mapp, the
91; Id. at 23 n.2. Thus, the Court noted that coerced confessions and violations of the right
to counsel always result in suppression. Id.
17 Id. at 23.
"See, e.g., United States v. Vandemark, 522 17.2c1 1019, 1022 (9th Cir, 1975) (admission of
illegally obtained evidence at probation hearings does not violate Fourth Amendment); United
States v. Schipani, 435 F.2d 26, 28 (2d Cir. 1970) (admission of illegally obtained evidence at
sentencing does not violate Fourth Amendment).
" 435 F.2d at 28.
"Id at 27.
1 " 11 Id. at 28.
1 °2 522 F.2d at 1022.
"See Alderman, 394 U.S. at 174-75.
"See Calandra, 414 U.S, at 348,
1 "5 Id. at 354.
1 "6 /(1, at 341,
1 °7 1d. at 351-52.
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Fourth Amendment does not require the suppression of all illegally
obtained evidence in every circumstance.m"Instead, the Calandra court
identified the exclusionary rule as a mere creation of the courts instead
of a Constitutional constraint.' 09 By rejecting the argument that the
Fourth Amendment mandates the suppression of illegally obtained
evidence, the Court limited the application of the exclusionary rule to
its underlying justifications. The underlying policies behind the exclu-
sionary rule, therefore, took on greater significance as they provided
the sole basis for its application.""
The Court in Calandra, moreover, did not merely limit the appli-
cation of the exclusionary rule to cases justified by the rule's underly-
ing policy justifications."' The Court also confirmed that the Linkletter
decision had rejected the use of the exclusionary rule for remedial
purposes." 2 The Calandra Court reasoned that because any benefit
produced by suppression comes too late to provide reparation, such a
rationale could not justify the suppression of reliable evidence."' Fi-
nally, the Court in Calandra also found that deterrence, rather than
judicial integrity, should serve as the primary purpose for the applica-
tion of the exclusionary rule."4 Calandra, therefore, marks a major
development in the Court's view of the exclusionary rule."' The Su-
preme Court not only determined that the exclusionary rule serves as
a judicial creation, limited by its policy justifications, but also whittled
the trio of justifications down to deterrence and judicial integrity, with
deterrence regarded as the rule's primary purpose." 6
Having reduced the justifications for the application of the exclu-
sionary rule down to deterrence and judicial integrity, the Court then
began to single out deterrence as the sole justification for the rule's
application. 17 In 1974, in Michigan v. Tucker, the United States Su-
preme Court permitted the admission of evidence obtained from a
violation of the Fifth Amendment where the events at issue occurred
prior to the Court's ruling in Miranda. 18
 In so holding, the Court
108
 Id. at 348.
1119 Calandra, 411 U.S. at 348.
119 See id. at 349.
111 See id.
112 Id. at 347.
113 See id. at 347-49.




117 See, e.g., United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 458 n.35 (1976); Michigan v. Tucker, 417
U.S. 433, 450 n.25 (1974).
118 417 U.S. at 450.
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reasoned that preserving the integrity of the judiciary does not serve
as an adequate independent ground for the exclusion of reliable evi-
dence.'1 t' Although the seizure of the evidence at issue in Tucker vio-
lated the Fifth Amendment rather than the Fourth Amendment, the
Court analyzed the potential suppression of evidence in an analogous
fashion. 12" Using this analysis, the Court determined that, because the
suppression of the statements that resulted from this constitutional
wrong would only produce a minimal deterrent effect, admission of
the illegally obtained evidence did not violate the Constitution. 12 '
Several years later, the Supreme Court completed its devolution
of the rationale behind the exclusionary rule to a single policy—deter-
rence.' 22 In 1976, in United States v. Janis, the United States Supreme
Court held that the exclusionary rule does not forbid one sovereign
from using evidence in a civil proceeding illegally obtained by another
sovereign. 128
 In Janis, the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") assessed
taxes on an individual based on information obtained illegally by the
Los Angeles police. 124
 The Court permitted the IRS's use of this infor-
mation for the purposes of its tax assessment.' 25 In ruling in such a
fashion, the Court, almost seventy years after it first introduced the
rationale in Weeks, rejected the application of the exclusionary rule for
the purpose of preserving the integrity of the judiciary. 12" The Supreme
Court in Janis, thus, completed its paring of the trio of justifications
for the exclusionary rule down to one—the deterrence of unlawful
activity by law enforcement officers. 127
Having reduced the exclusionary rule down to a method of deter-
ring illegal police activity, the Supreme Court also paved the way for
further limitations on the rule's application.' 28 Courts, when deciding
119 1.1, at 450 n.25.
110 1.1. at 446-47.
1121 Id. at 450.
122 Sec /oafs, 428 U.S. at 458 n.35.
123 1d. at 454,
124 Id. at 436-38.
12r' Id. at. 454.
126 Id. at 458 n.35.
127 Janis, 428 U.S. at 446.
128 See, e.g., Evans, 115 S. Ct. at 1193; Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340,349 (1987); United States
v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897,926 (1984),
In addition to the evolution of the Supreme Court's treatment of the exclusionary rule, the
United States Court of Appeals ki• the Fifth Circuit also carved out an exception to the exclu-
sionary rule. Sec generally United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980). In Williams, the
Fifth Circuit created a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule for warrantless searches. Id.
at 840. The court, rehearing en bane, utilized the Supreme Court's deterrence analysis and
refused to suppress tainted evidence since the officer in question conducted his actions in good
faith. Id. For the facts and further treatment, see infra notes 135-41 and accompanying text.
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whether to apply the exclusionary rule, must now only weigh the
likelihood of a sufficient deterrent effect against the societal cost of
withholding reliable information from the trial process. 129 Reduced to
this question, the Supreme Court has increasingly found that the costs
of exclusion outweigh any deterrent benefit. 13°
Using this cost-balancing approach, in 1984, in United States v.
Leon, the United States Supreme Court significantly cut back on the
application of the exclusionary rule by creating a good faith exception
for searches conducted under the authority of a warrant."' In Leon,
the Court permitted the admission of evidence seized by officers acting
in reasonable reliance on a warrant later ruled invalid.' 32 The police
in Leon seized drugs from the defendant after obtaining a warrant.'"
The trial court later determined that the warrant lacked probable
cause.' 34 In permitting the admission of the drugs at trial, the Court
limited the intended deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule to police
misconduct rather than errors by magistrates.' 3  Thus, because the
officer in question acted in objective good faith, the Court reasoned,
excluding this tainted evidence would not serve to deter future Fourth
Amendment violations by the officer."" Therefore, the low deterrent
effect, balanced against the high cost incurred by society upon exclud-
ing the evidence, led the Leon court to permit the admission of tainted
evidence.'s7
Several years later, in 1987, in Illinois v. Krull, the United States
Supreme Court expanded the good faith exception created by Leon by
refusing to suppress evidence obtained by an officer who acted in
objectively reasonable reliance on a statute later invalidated. 138 In Krull,
a police officer, while acting pursuant to a state statute that permitted
the inspection of records of auto part dealerships, ascertained that the
lot contained stolen automobiles. 130 The police seized the cars, but the
court excluded the evidence from admission at tria1. 140 The Court,
basing its decision on the reasoning in Leon, upheld the admission of
129 See Evans, 115 S. Ct. at 1191.
130 See supra note 82 and accompanying text
131 968 U.S. at 926.
132
 Id. at 903,926.
133 ld. at 902.
134 See id. at 903.
135 Id. at 917.
1313 Leon, 468 U.S. at 919-20.
157 Id. at 926.
138 480 U.S. at 349-50.
13`9
	 at 343.
140 See id. at 343-49.
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this evidence."' Justice Blackmun wrote that if an officer has acted in
good faith when reasonably relying on a statute, suppressing the reli-
able evidence would produce, at most, a minimal deterrent effect, and
thus, courts should admit such evidence." 2 The Court limited this
exception, however, to those instances where the statute does not
immediately appear unconstitutional. 143 By limiting the justification of
the exclusionary rule to deterrence, the Court once again created
room to carve out an additional exception to the rule's application for
situations where officers reasonably rely on a statute.'"
Finally, in 1995, in Arizona v. Evans, the most recent opinion on
this topic, the United States Supreme Court again applied the reason-
ing set out in Leon to further cut back the applicability of the ex-
clusionary rule. 146 In Arizona v. Evans, the Court held that the exclu-
sionary rule does not require the suppression of evidence seized in
violation of the Fourth Amendment when the illegal search resulted
from a clerical error by a court employee. 146 The Court reasoned that
suppression of this evidence would not produce a significant deterrent
effect and thus the cost of suppressing this evidence clearly outweighed
the minimal deterrent effect that would result from suppression. 147 In
addition, the Evans Court, by distinguishing between an officer of the
police and court employees, ended a simmering debate by limiting the
intended deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule to police miscon-
duct rather than the law enforcement system as a whole. 148 Thus, by
further expanding this good faith exception, the Supreme Court in
Evans cut back on the applicability of the exclusionary rule."'
In sum, the gradual evolution of justifications behind the exclu-
sionary rule has resulted in an increasing number of limitations on the
rule's application.' 66 By initially viewing the suppression of evidence as
141 /d. at 349-50.
1421d
K11111., 480 U.S. at 349-50.
144 1d. at 349.





159 See Evans, 115 S. Ct. at 1193 (exclusionary rule not applicable to clerical errors); Krull,
480 U.S. at 349-50 (good litith exception to exclusionary rule for objective reliance on statute
later declared unconstitutional); Leon, 468 U.S. at 926 (1984) (good faith exception to exclusion-
ary rule for objective reliance on warrant later found to lack probable cause); Rakas v. Illinois,
439 U.S. 128,134 (1978) (limitation on standing for challenges to exclusionary rule); Panes, 428
U.S. at 454 (sovereign may use evidence obtained illegally by another sovereign); Calandra, 414
U.S. at 351-52 (tainted evidence admissible in grand jury proceedings).
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necessary to preserve the integrity of the judiciary, the Court could
logically permit few, if any, exceptions to its application.' 5 ' As the
purpose of deterring unlawful police activity took on increased impor-
tance, the Court freed its hands to admit tainted evidence whenever
the costs of its exclusion outweighed the amount of deterrent effect
that would result from suppression.' 52 In recent years, therefore, the
Supreme Court has determined with increasing frequency that the cost
of excluding reliable evidence outweighs the deterrent effect that
suppression would produce.i 5"
III. EFFORTS OF THE 104T1-1 CONGRESS TO CURTAIL OR
REPEAL THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
The actions of the 104th Congress, for analytical purposes, will
probably take on added importance due to the historic significance of
this particular Congress. The 1994 elections provided Republicans with
control of both the House and the Senate for the first time since
1955.' 54 As a result of this change, many proposals that leading Demo-
crats have long blocked now face a much greater chance of passage
into law. 155 For instance, Republicans have long desired to reform the
exclusionary rule, and their takeover of the Congress may provide
them with an opportunity to do so.
In the past, Congress did not sit idly by as the Court evolved in
its treatment of the exclusionary rtile.' 56 With the historic increase
in the crime rate and an even sharper increase in public apprehen-
sion of the crime problem, politicians from differing ideological back-
151 See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914).
155
 See Evans, 115 S. Ct. at 1193.
15 :5 See id.; Krug 480 U.S. at 349; Leon, 468 U.S. at 926.
15' See When Was the Last Time?, ST. PEITASRURC TIMES, Nov. 8, 1994, at A9.
155 See infra note 160 and accompanying text.
156 A list of proposals to reform or repeal the exclusionary rule over the last five Congresses
includes: S, 77, 103d Cong. (1993) (proposal by Sen. Thurmond to create good faith exception
for warrantless searches); H.R. 1400, 102d Cong. (1991) (provision by Rep. Michel in compre-
hensive crime bill to reform exclusionary rule); S. 1151, 102d Cong. (1991) (provision by Sen.
Craig in comprehensive crime hill to reform exclusionary rule); S. 635, 102d Cong. (1991)
(provision by Sen. Thurmond in comprehensive crime bill creating good faith exception for
warrantless searches); S. 151, 102d Cong. (1991) (proposal by Sen. Thurmond creating good
faith exception for warrantless searches); S. 379, 101st Cong. (1989) (proposal by Sen. Hatch to
repeal exclusionary rule); S. 87, 101st Cong. (1989) (proposal by Sen. Thurmond to establish
good faith exception for warrantless searches); H.R. 1334, 100th Cong. (1987) (proposal by Rep.
Lungren to reform exclusionary rule); S. 326, 100th Cong. (1987) (proposal to replace exclu-
sionary rule with tort remedy); S. 278, 100th Cong. (1987) (proposal by Sen. Thurmond to
establish a good faith exception to exclusionary rule); S. 2302, 99th Cong. (1986) (proposal by
Sen. Thurmond to establish a good faith exception to exclusionary rule); H.R. 1126, 99th Cong.
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grounds have struggled to appear tough on crime. 157 Congress has
frequently targeted the exclusionary rule in its attempt to wage a war
on crime. 158 Members have introduced measures to either repeal or
curtail the application of the exclusionary rule in the last five Con-
gresses.'" Such measures generally meet with success in the House but
get tied up or rejected either in the Senate or in committee confer-
ences. 1"'
The 104th Congress continued this trend by introducing measures
pertaining to the exclusionary rule in both the House and the Sen-
ate. 16 ' Generally, such measures have taken two possible forms—either
an outright repeal of the exclusionary rule or a more moderate crea-
tion of a good faith exception for warrantless searches.'" Typically, the
House of Representatives took quick and definitive action while the
Senate has proceeded with a more deliberate pace.'"
A. Efforts in the House of Representatives:
The Exclusionary Rule Reform Act of 1995
During this past congressional session, Representative William
McCollum of Florida introduced a measure, H.R. 666, entitled the
Exclusionary Rule Reform Act of 1995 ("Exclusionary Rule Reform
(1986) (proposal by Rep. Lungren to reform exclusionary rule); S. 237, 99th Cong. (1985)
(proposal by Sen. Thurmond to establish a good fiaith exception to exclusionary rule); S. 29, 99th
Cong. (1985) (proposal by Sen. Hatch to eliminate exclusionary rule).
157 See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
155 See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
1 " See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
16" See Ruth Marcus, House Would Widen Use of 111-Cohen Evidence, WASH. Post - , Sept.. 17,
198G, al Al 6. For example, in 1986, the United States House of Representatives approved an
amendment sponsored by Representative Lungren to create a good faith exception to the
exclusionary rule for warrantless searches by a vole of 259-153. See id. Despite the overwhelming
passage of this provision in the House, the amendment failed to survive in the House-Senate
committee conferences. See 132 CONG. REC. 1-19,302-02 (daily ed.. Oct. 7, 1986) (statement of
Rep. Gekas). Senator Dole, a long-lime advocate of reform of the exclusionary rule, noted that
the conference committee repeatedly struck down reform of the exclusionary rule. 137 CONC.
Rec. 518,664-02 (daily ed. No 27, 1991) (statement of Sem Dole).
"For example, Representative McContain introduced the Exclusionary Rule Refinin Act in
the House. See. H.R. 666, 104th Cong. (1995). In the Senate, Senator Dole offered the Violent
Crime Control and Law Enforcement Improvement Act of 1995. See S. 3, 104th Cong. (1995). This
proposal contained a section that repealed the exclusionary rule. Id. § 507. Senator Thurmond
sponsored the Exclusionary Rule Limitation Act of 1995. See S. 54, 104th Cong. (1995). In addition,
Sen. Kyl offered the Crime Prevention Act of 1995, which contained a proposal to reform the
exclusionary rule. See S, 1495, 104th Cong., § 601 (1995).
112 Compare S. 3 (substituting tort remedy in place of exclusionary rule) with H.R. 666
(creating good faith exception for warrantless searches).
"The Exclusionary Rule Reform Act, sponsored by Representative William McCollum of
Florida, passed the House of Representatives on Feb. 8, 1995. See 141 CONG. REC. H1,400 (1995).
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Act") . 164
 This measure attempts to carve out a good faith exception for
warrantless searches) 65
 The Exclusionary Rule Reform Act provides
that evidence resulting from a search or seizure that violates the Fourth
Amendment shall nonetheless be admissible if the "search or seizure
was carried out in circumstances justifying an objectively reasonable
belief that it was in conformity with the Fourth Amendment." 1 "6 Under
this provision, reviewing judges must admit evidence if they determine
that the officer who seized the evidence could have reasonably believed
his actions conformed with the Fourth Amendment) 67 Such a provision
would extend much more deference to decisions made on the spot by
police officers) 68
 For example, in the introductory Bayless situation, if
this proposal had existed at that time as law, Judge Baer would most
likely have had to admit the ninety pounds of drugs as evidence
because, although he ruled that they did not constitute reasonable
suspicion, the facts appear to justify a basis for Officer Carroll to believe
that he had reasonable suspicion. 16"
The Exclusionary Rule Reform Act also carves out an exception
for evidence seized in violation of a statute.'" The measure provides
that courts shall not exclude evidence on the grounds that the search
or seizure violated a statute, administrative rule or procedural rule
unless such a provision explicitly includes an exclusionary remedy."'
In addition, judges may nonetheless admit evidence seized in violation
of a legislative enactment that provides for an exclusionary remedy if
they determine that the officer had an objectively reasonable belief
that the seizure conformed with the statute)"
At the time of publication, this measure, as well as other related measures, awaited the recom-
mendation and approval of the Senate Judiciary Committee. See id.
164 H.R. 666.
11x,
	 id. § 2.
L66 H.R. 666, § 2, provides in relevant part:
Evidence which is obtained as a result or a search or seizure shall not be excluded
in a proceeding in a court of the United States on the ground that the search or
seizure was in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States, if the search or seizure was carried out in circumstances justifying an objec-




1 "' See Pines, .vtztzra note 1, at 1.
170 id.
17L Id,
' 72 KR. 666, § 2 provides in relevant part:
(I) GENERALLY.- Evidence shall riot be excluded in a proceeding in a court of
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Interestingly, the Exclusionary Rule Reform Act does not extend
this good faith exception to searches conducted by agents of the
Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms agency ("ATF") or the IRS.'" By limit-
ing the application of this exception, the Exclusionary Rule Reform
Act provides greater Fourth Amendment protection to white-collar
criminals and individuals under investigation for violations related to
guns." This limitation may have resulted from a growing disenchant-
ment with the ATF, especially after the incidents at Waco and Ruby
Ridge, as well as the more traditional distrust of the IRS.'" Neverthe-
less, bipartisan leaders have frequently criticized this limitation to the
application of a statutory good faith exception on the grounds that
such exceptions lack consistency.'"
the United States on the ground that it was obtained in violation of a statute, an
administrative rule or regulation, or a rule of procedure unless exclusion is ex-
pressly authorized by statute or by a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant
to statutory authority,
(2) SPECIAL RULE RELATING TO OBJECTIVELY REASONABLE SEARCHES
AND SEIZURES.- Evidence which is otherwise excludable under paragraph (I)
shall not be excluded if the search or seizure was carried out in circumstances
justifying an objectively reasonable belief that the search or seizure was in conform-
ity with the statute, administrative rule or regulation, or rule of procedure, the
violation of which occasioned its being excludable.
Id.
173 See id, § 2(d) (e). On February 8, 1995, the House, by voice vote, agreed to a measure
sponsored by Ohio Democrat Representative .James Traficant that exempts searches or seizures
carried out by, or under the authority of, the IRS from the relaxation of the exclusionary rule.
See 141 GONG, REC. 1-11,393 (1995). In addition, the House, by a vote of 228-198, also agreed not
to extend this exemption to the ATF. See 141 CONG. REAL H 1,390 (1995). Ironically, Democratic
members of the House sponsored this measure and provided most of its support.. See id. The bill
was one in a series of bills that, in an attempt by Democrats to weaken the reform, exempted
federal agencies from the relaxing of the exclusionary rule. See id. Most of the other attempts,
however, did not receive Republican support and thus failed. See 141 CONG. Rae. H1,398 (1995).
For instance, Democrat Representative Jose Serrano of New York sponsored a measure that would
have exempted the Immigration and Naturalization Service from this reform. See id, This amend-
ment, however, did not gain the support of a single Republican and thus failed by a vote of
102-330. See id.
174
 See 11.R. 666, § 2.
175 See All! Under Seige, 'TIME, July 24, 1995, at 20. Time recently ran a cover story on the
growing distrust of the ATE See id. This article detailed the general distrust, especially in the
South and Midwest, of the ATF as well as the growing movement calling for the elimination of
the agency. Id.
176 See Federal Crime Control, supra note 19 (testimony of Louis Freeh, FBI Director, Feb. 14,
1995). In congressional testimony, Senator Biden, although expressing opposition to the reform
of the exclusionary rule, singled out this effort by the House denying the ATF and the IRS use
of this good faith exception. See id. FBI Director Louis Freeh joined Senator Bidet) in opposing
this inconsistent application and argued that the Senate should extend the good faith exception
to include all federal law enforcement agencies. See id.
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The Exclusionary Rule Reform Act passed in the House with
resounding success, by a vote of 289-142, during the early part of
1995. 177
 Having passed the House, this bill, along with a number of
related provisions, now awaits the recommendation of the Senate Com-
mittee on the Judiciary.' 78
 Finally, due to President Clinton's concern
with appearing tough on crime during an election year, commentators
believe the President may sign this provision into law.' 79 At the time of
publishing, no action had yet been taken.
B. Measures Introduced in the Senate to Reform or
Repeal the Exclusionary Rule
1. The Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Improvement
Act of 1995
In the 104th Congress, Senator Robert Dole of Kansas introduced
a bill, S.3, intended to continue the war on crime.'s° This extensive
150-page document contains a variety of constitutional reforms, such
as a reduction in the number of federal death penalty appeals, man-
datory restitution for victims of violent crime and habeas corpus re-
form. 181
 This bill also contains a proposal to repeal the exclusionary
rule and replace it with the creation of a remedy in tort. 18" At the time
of publication, the bill awaits the recommendation of the Senate Com-
mittee on the Judiciary. 1 e"
Section 507 of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement
Improvement Act of 1995 ("Violent Crime Control Act") provides that
courts shall not exclude otherwise admissible evidence on the grounds
that a search or seizure violated the Fourth Amendment.'" In addition,
177
	 141 CONG. Rec. S2,399-40I (1995).
178 See 141 CONG. REC. 52,399 (1995).
17" See Nat Hentoff, Say Goodbye to the Fourth Amendment, SACRAMENTO BEE, Feb. 6, 1995, at
B6; Mathis, supra note 30, at A17. Commentators have argued that President Clinton's concern
lies with the number of new police officers authorized by the bill rather than its reform of the
exclusionary rule. See, e.g.. Hentoff, supra; Mathis, supra note 30, at A17.
18°S. 3, 104th Cong. (1995).
181 Id. §§ 501-510.
182 /d. § 507,
183 See 141 CONG. REX. D936 (1995).
1 " Section 507(b) (1)(a) provides in relevant pan:
(a) EVIDENCE OBTAINED BY OBJECTIVELY REASONABLE SEARCH OR SE1-
ZURE.—Evidence obtained as a result of a search or seizure that is otherwise
admissible in a Federal criminal proceeding shall not be excluded in a proceeding
in a court of the United States on the ground that the search or seizure was in
violation of the fourth amendment to the Constitution.
Id.
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unless an enactment explicitly creates an exclusionary remedy, Senator
Dole's bill provides that courts shall not exclude evidence on the
grounds that officials obtained the evidence in violation of a statute,
administrative rule or rule of court procedure.'" The provision con-
cludes that the section shall not be construed as requiring the exclu-
sion of evidence.'" This provision applies to all evidence introduced
in federal criminal proceedings regardless of whether a state or federal
officer seized the evidence.' 87
 As a consequence of this Act, unless a
state statute prohibits such conduct, a local officer would probably be
able to conduct his searches with less restraint if the prosecution is
brought in federal court.'"
Senator Dole's proposal differs from the measure passed by the
House in a number of ways. Rather than carving out an exception to
the application of the exclusionary rule, the measure simply eliminates
the exclusionary rule.'" On this point, therefore, the Senate version
goes much further than its House counterpart. In addition, the meas-
ures differ on the suppression of evidence based on violations of
statutes.'" Both measures require a statute to provide explicitly for
exclusion before a judge must suppress the evidence on the grounds
of a statutory violation.' 91
 The House version, goes further, however, by
also creating a good faith exception for evidence seized in violation of
a statute even if the statute provides an exclusionary remedy. 1 " 2 Finally,
the Violent Crime Control Act permits the admission of tainted evi-
dence only in criminal proceedings whereas the exception created by
the House applies to all judicial proceedings.E"
Having provided for the admission of tainted evidence in a crimi-
nal proceeding, the Violent Crime Control Act creates a Fairly elabo-
185 S. 3, § 507(b) (1) (b) provides in relevant part:
(h) EVIDENCE NOT EXCLUDABLE BY STATUTE OR RULE—Evidence shall not
be excluded in a proceeding in a court of the United Status on the ground that it
was obtained in violation of a smite, an administ rative rule, or a rule of court
procedure unless exclusion is expressly authorized by statute or by a rule prescribed
by the Supreme Court pursuant to chapter 131 of title 28.
Id.
186 1d. § 507(h) (1) (c).
187 See id. § 507(b)( )(b).
188 See id.
1" Compare S. 3, § 507(b) (1) (a) with I.I.R. 666, 104th Gong, § 2 (1995).
19° COMPan? S. 3 § 507(b) (1) (h) (violation of statute immaterial) with H.R. 666, § 2 (good
faith exception for violation of statute).
191 Compare S. 3, § 507(b) (1) (h) (violation of statute immaterial) with H.R. 666, § 2 (good
faith exception for violation of statute).
192
 H.R. 666, § 2.
1 • 3 Compares. 3, § 507(b) (1) (a) with II.R. 666, § 2.
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rate tort system in an effort to deter illegal police conduct.' 94 In par-
ticular, the Act proposes a bifurcated procedure—creating a method
of recovery for the violated party and permitting sanctions against the
officer.' 95 As created, the system applies to federal, state and local
officials if the case is prosecuted in federal court.' 96
By the Violent Crime Control Act's imposition of liability on the
United States, a victim of an illegal search may recover the full amount
of actual damages.' 97 The court, after a trial, determines the amount
of damages to award.'" The Act places no limitation on the amount
awarded for actual damages. 199
In addition to actual damages, the Act proposes that a court in
some instances might also impose punitive damages. 2" The court,
however, may award such damages only to those parties not convicted
by the tainted evidence. 2°' Furthermore, the statute caps punitive dam-
ages at $10,000 and directs the courts to weigh a number of factors
in setting the award. 202 In addition, Senator Dole's proposal would
prohibit courts from providing an award exceeding $30,000 unless
the actual damage inflicted exceeded $30,000. 205 Within a certain
range, therefore, the cap on punitive damages would slide downward
as the amount of actual damages increases. 2°4 Thus, once actual dam-
ages exceed $20,000, the amount of punitive damages that a court





1 "" S. 3, § 507(c).
2°° Id. This bill provides six factors to be considered by the court in determining whether to
award punitive damages:
(1) the extent of the investigative or law enforcement officer's deviation from
permissible conduct;
(2) the extent to which the violation was willful, reckless, or grossly negligent;
(3) the extent to which the aggrieved person's privacy was invaded;
(4) the extent of the aggrieved person's physical, mental, and emotional injury;
(5) the extent of any property damage; and
(6) the effect that making an award of punitive damages would have in preventing
future violations of the fourth amendinent to the Constitution.
Id.
2" 1 See id.
2°2 Id.
203 Id,
2" See S. 3, § 507(c).
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could award decreases to zero when actual damages are $30,000 or
greater. 205
To further deter illegal conduct, the Violent Crime Control Act
also empowers the employing agency to discipline officers who violate
a person's Fourth Amendment rights. 2 U6 Agencies, after providing no-
tice and a hearing, may employ their discretion in determining the
punishment. 2° 7
 Agencies may not impose sanctions on officers who
conducted a search in good faith. 2"8
Returning to the introductory Bayless incident, if the Violent
Crime Control Act had existed as contemporaneous law, it would have
required Judge Baer to admit the drugs as evidence at trial. 209
 Carol
Bayless, however, could bring a tort action for actual damages against
the United States. 21 ° The proposed Act would permit this cause of
action, even though a local officer conducted the search, because the
prosecution introduced the evidence in a federal proceeding. 2 " In
addition, as long as the use of the evidence did not result in her con-
viction, Ms. Bayless could also seek punitive damages up to $10,000. 212
Finally, the New York Police Department, after providing notice and a
hearing, could take action to discipline Officer Carroll if the depart-
ment determined that the officer had not conducted the search in
good faith. 213
2. Exclusionary Rule Limitation Act of 1995
In 1995, Senator Strom Thurmond of South Carolina sponsored
a measure, the Exclusionary Rule Limitation Act of 1995, that would
curtail, rather than repeal, applications of the exclusionary rule. 214 This
bill represents a more moderate response to criticisms of the exclu-
sionary remedy. 216
 The limitation, however, applies in all judicial pro-













 S. 54, 104th Cong. (1995).
215 Compare id. § 2 (good faith exception to exclusionary rule) with S. 3, § 507(6)(1)(6)
(replace exclusionary rule with tort remedy),
211 See S. 54, § 2.
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mond's bill currently awaits the consideration and approval of the
Senate Committee on the Judiciary at the time of publication. 217
The Exclusionary Rule Limitation Act maintains the current ex-
clusionary remedy but limits the instances in which courts could apply
it. The bill provides that courts should not suppress evidence on the
grounds that the search or seizure violated the Fourth Amendment if
the investigating officers undertook the search with an objectively
reasonable belief that their conduct conformed with constitutional
requirements."' In addition, the use of a warrant, unless obtained
through intentional misrepresentation, would constitute prima facie
evidence of such a reasonable belief. 219 Furthermore, the Exclusionary
Rule Limitation Act, in a fashion similar to the Violent Crime Control
Act, provides that judges should not exclude evidence from any judicial
proceeding on the grounds that the seizure violated a statute unless
the statute explicitly requires suppression."' The measure, however,
does not extend a good faith exception to searches conducted in
violation of statutes that do explicitly provide for suppression.'" Sena-
tor Thurmond's measure, therefore, differs on this point from the
version passed by the House of Representatives.'"
3. Crime Prevention Act of 1995
Finally, in 1995, Senator Jon Kyl offered an extensive bill, the
Crime Prevention Act of 1995, which proposed legislative efforts in-
tended to combat crime. 22" The Crime Prevention Act contains a meas-
ure creating a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule for war-
27 See 141 CoNG. REC. S173—S201 (1995).
218 S. 54, § 2. The proposed legislation provides in relevant part:
Evidence which is obtained as a result of a search or seizure shall not be excluded
in a proceeding in a court of the United States on the ground that the search or
seizure was in violation of the fourth amendment to the Constitution of the United
States, if the search or seizure was undertaken in an objectively reasonable belief
that it was in conformity with the fourth amendment . . .
219 See id.
2211
 Id. The bill provides in relevant part:
Except as specifically provided by statute or rule of procedure, evidence which is
otherwise admissible shall not be excluded in a proceeding in a court of the United
States on the ground that the evidence was obtained in violation of a statute or rule
of procedure, or of a regulation issued pursuant thereto.
221 Id.
222 Compare id. with H.R. 666, 104th Cong. § 2 (1995).
223 S. 1495, 104th Cong. (1995).
Id.
Id.
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rantless searches. 224
 This exception duplicates the version passed by the
House of Representatives, the Exclusionary Rule Reform Act of 1995,
but also extends its application to cover the IRS and the ATF. 225 At the
time of publication, this provision awaited the review of the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSALS CURRENTLY IN CONGRESS
Despite, or due to, the Supreme Court's evolution in its treatment
of constitutional criminal procedure, the crime rate in the United
States has surged in the past decade. 22" Public opinion polls indicate
general dissatisfaction with the current crime situation. 227
 As such, the
reforms of the exclusionary rule currently proposed in Congress pro-
vide an appropriate response to this public concern. The inherent
weaknesses of the exclusionary remedy justify these proposed reforms.
The exclusionary rule, however, retains some merit and Congress,
therefore, should not wholly discard it. Rather, Congress should create
a good faith exception to warrantless searches, similar to the one that
already exists in the Fifth Circuit. 228
 Such a proposal would be consti-
tutional and justified by policy concerns. 229 In addition, because the
Supreme Court has not yet expanded the good faith exception created
in Leon, Congress should create such an exception by passing the
Exclusionary Rule Reform Act.
Based on an analysis of the evolution of the exclusionary rule, the
United States Supreme Court would probably uphold the current
proposals to reform the exclusionary rule. 2" The Supreme Court, in
United States v. Calandra, recognized that the Fourth Amendment does
not mandate the suppression of tainted evidence. 28 ' Because the Con-




226 See supra note 29 and accompanying text. For an extensive compilation of crime statistics,
see FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES (1994) [hereinafter CRIME.
IN THE UNITED STATES].
227 A recent study indicated that 93% of Americans polled believe that addressing the crime
problem should be an absolute priority of the federal government. Federal Crime Control, supra
note 19 (testimony of Louis Frech, FM Director, Apr, 14, 1995).
228 See United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830, 840 (5th Cir. 1980).
229 See Arizona v. Evans, 115 S. Ct. 1185, 1191 (1995); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897,
906-07 (1984); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974).
73° See Leon, 468 U.S. at 906-08; United States vjanis, 428 U.S. 433, 453-54 (1976); Calandra,
414 U.S. at 348.
251 414 U.S. at 348.
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gress possesses the power to curtail or repeal the exclusionary remedy
by passing legislation. 232 In addition, the Supreme Court, in United
States v. Janis, identified deterrence of illegal police activity as the sole
justification for the application of the exclusionary rule.2" If Congress,
therefore, determines that the suppression of tainted evidence does
not adequately deter such illegal conduct, or if Congress determines
that an alternative method more effectively deters such conduct, cur-
tailing or repealing the exclusionary rule would not only be constitu-
tional but also appropriate.
Noting this evolution of the exclusionary rule's rationale, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in United States v.
Williams determined that the Constitution permits the creation of a
good faith exception to the exclusionary rule for warrantless
searches. 234
 Recognizing deterrence as the justification for the exclu-
sionary rule, the Fifth Circuit held that courts should not suppress
evidence discovered by officers in the course of actions taken in good
faith and based on a reasonable, though mistaken, belief that their
actions complied with constitutional requirements. 235 In Williams, a
Drug Enforcement Agent ("DEA") officer, who had previously arrested
the defendant for possession of heroin, arrested the defendant for
violating a condition of her release order. 236
 The officer conducted a
search incident to the arrest and discovered a packet of heroin in her
possession. 2" At trial, the district court suppressed the heroin because
the arresting officer, a DEA officer, violated his statutory authority by
arresting a party for violation of a release order.238 The Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit reversed this decision, reasoning that the
arresting officer acted on a reasonable belief in the propriety of his
actions and thus permitted the admission of evidence relating to drug
possession. 2" As a result, the Williams court declined to suppress the
tainted evidence because it indicated that suppression would not serve
to deter illegal activity on the part of the officer in the future. 24° In the
232 See id.
2" 428 U,S. at 458 n.3.
234 622 F.2d at 840.
235 id.
256 Id. at 834. Ironically, the officer, working on unrelated matters, accidentally spotted the
defendant at an airport. See id.
257 See id.
258 See id. at 835.
259 Williams, 622 F.2d at 840.
240 itd.
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Fifth Circuit, therefore, a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule
for warrantless searches currently exists.m
The ruling in Williams both identifies the need for an exception
and provides a model for the federalization of such an exception. 242
Because the arresting officer believed that his actions conformed with
existing law, the exclusion of the heroin would not serve to deter the
officer from committing similar actions in the future. 243
 The suppres-
sion of such evidence, however, would result in the release of a party
obviously guilty of both possessing an illegal drug and violating a
release order. 244
 Suppressing the evidence in this instance, therefore,
would have produced little or no societal benefit at a tremendous
cost. 245
As seen by the Williams example, mechanistic application of the
exclusionary remedy may produce unjust results. In instances where
the cost of exclusion clearly outweighs its benefits, therefore, courts
should refrain from suppressing tainted evidence. The increasingly
violent nature of crime combined with predictions that such trends will
continue suggest that the cost of exclusion will frequently outweigh the
benefits, justifying the efforts of the 104th Congress to extend the ex-
clusionary rule's good faith exception to include warrantless searches.
The current high level of crime in the United States, even with a
recent downturn, calls for the reform of the exclusionary rule. 246 For
the period from 1990 to 1994, the incidence of crime in relation to
the population decreased 10%. 2" This recent downturn, however, pro-
vides faint hope of a lasting decline in levels of crime. The total crime
rate still lingers at a level 13% higher than that in 1985. 248
 During this
same ten year period, the violent crime rate soared by 29%. 249 In
addition, the arrest rate among juveniles, the fastest growing segment
of the population, increased by 6%, suggesting that a new crime wave
may result in the near future. 2"
241 See id.
242 See M.
249 See Leon, 468 U.S. at 918-19.
244 See Williams, 622 U.S. at 835.
241
 See Evans, 115 S. Ct.. at 1193.
246 See
247 See. CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES, StipM note 226, at 6.
248 See id.
249 See id. at 11.
250 See Federal Crime Control, supra note 19 (testimony of Louis Free'', FBI Director, Apr. 14,
1995).
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Even if this expected increase in crime never arrives, the current
level, despite the recent downturn, is unacceptable. Of those polled,
93% of United States citizens believed that the federal government
should make addressing the crime problem an absolute priority.'m
Some defenders of the present application of the exclusionary rule
argue that the public exaggerates the problem due to the more recent
introduction of crime, especially violent crime, to suburbia and smaller
cities.252 Such arguments overlook the role of a representative democ-
racy—to respond to the demands of the voting public.
In addition, recent studies of the current level of crime justify an
increased concern with the crime rate. In 1994, almost fourteen mil-
lion incidents triggered the FBI's crime index.'" During this year, a
crime index offense occurred in the United States at a rate of one every
two seconds. 254 Property crimes occurred at a rate of one every three
seconds.255 As a result of these incidents, it is estimated that $15.6
billion in property was stolen in 1994. 256
 This cost to society does not
include the secondary costs of crime, such as the cost of attempting to
prevent theft. In addition, during the same year, one violent crime
occurred every seventeen seconds. 257 This rate resulted in almost two
million incidents of violent crime across the nation. 258 Finally, law
enforcement agencies recorded only a 21% clearance rate for collec-
tive crime index offenses. 259 In sum, the American public may find such
statistics unacceptable and demand increased action.
The current limitations of the exclusionary rule hinder the effec-
tiveness of any increased law enforcement action. Numerous criticisms
of the exclusionary rule have developed over the decades since its
2.51 See
252 See, e.g., Casey Combs, Crime Rates in Mid-Sized Cities Surpassing Big-City Rates, YORK
DAILY Rae., Apr. 28, 1996, at 7; Christopher Ringwald, Forecast for Crime in Suburbs is Foggy, TIMES
UNION, OCt. 6, 1996, at Cl.
253 See CRIME IN 'DIE UNITED STATES, supra note 226, at 5. The Crime Index is composed of
selective offenses used to gauge fluctuations in the overall volume and rate of crime reported to
law enforcement. The offenses included arc the violent crimes of murder, non-negligent man-
slaughter, forcible rape, robbery, and aggravated assaults and the property crimes of hurglary,
larceny-theft, motor-vehicle theft, and arson. See id.
251 See id. at 4.
255 See id.
256 See id. at 6.
257 See id. at 4.
258 See CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES, Mira note 226, at 10.
259 See id. at 6. Crimes can be cleared by arrest or by exceptional means when some element
beyond law enforcement control precludes the placing of formal charges against the offender.
See id.
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inception.2" Such criticisms, due to their accuracy, deserve brief men-
tion. First, the exclusionary rule lacks any degree of proportionality. 26 '
Application of the exclusionary rule leads to the same result regardless
of whether the officer committed a serious violation or a minor indis-
cretion. 262 As Justice Powell noted in his dissent in Stone v. Powell, "The
disparity in particular cases between the error committed by the police
officer and the windfall afforded a guilty defendant by application of
the rule is contrary to the idea of proportionality that is essential to
the concept of justice."21 i3 Second, the exclusionary rule, because its
application comes in a court procedure well after the arrest, punishes
the prosecutor rather than the offending officer. 26^ Third, under the
current application of the exclusionary rule, only criminals benefit
while innocent victims of police violations are left without a remedy. 265
The only benefit produced by the exclusionary rule, suppression of
evidence at criminal trial, offers no recompense to those parties against
whom the prosecution does not bring charges. 266 As Justice Potter
Stewart recognized, "[I] nnocent victims of illegal searches and seizures
can derive no benefit from the exclusionary rule." 267 Finally, suppres-
sion of tainted evidence probably does not even deter police illegalities
but rather results only in the acquittal of guilty defendants. 2" Police
officers may conduct an illegal search for the purpose of confiscating
contraband, and as long as no charges are brought, the violated party
has little recourse. 269 The exclusion of tainted evidence, thus, offers
little deterrence of such searches.
Both the Exclusionary Rule Reform Act and the Violent Crime
Control Act attempt to answer many of the recurring criticisms of the
exclusionary rule. 2" At the same time, the effectiveness of the exclu-
26° Sot Bivens v, Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 418
(1971) (Burger, CJ., dissenting). For an excellent critique of the exclusionary rule, see Oaks,
Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. Cm. L. Rev. 665 (1970).
261 See Stone v. Powell, 428 U,S, 465, 490 (1976).
262 See id.
263 id.
264 See Bluer's, 403 U.S. at 416 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). With rare exceptions, law enforce-
ment agencies do not impose sanctions on the offending officer. See Oaks, supra note 260, at
725-27. Nothing in the application of the exclusionary rule encourages this practice to change.
See id.
265
 See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 415-16 (Burger, Cj., dissenting).
266 See id. (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
267 See Stewart, supra note '10, at 1396.
268 See Oaks, supra note '260, at 667, 678-709.
2159 See id.
270 See H.R. 666, 104th Cong. § 2 (1995); S. 3, 104th Cong. § 507 (1995).
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sionary rule as a deterrent should determine whether Congress should
replace the remedy or merely curtail its application. If the exclusionary
rule does deter some illegal police activity, then it retains value and
Congress should not repeal it. If the exclusionary rule offers no real
deterrent value, however, then Congress should discard the measure."'
The problem, as noted by Justice Blackmun in United States v. Janis,
lies in the difficulties of measuring the exclusionary rule's deterrent
value. 272
The exclusionary rule reforms contained in the Violent Crime
Control Act most effectively respond to traditional criticisms of the
exclusionary rule. 273 The substitution of a tort remedy for the suppres-
sion of tainted evidence offers a remedy for/both guilty and inno-
cent victims of illegal searches. 274 In addition(by requiring agencies to
sanction violating officers after a hearing,,this reform punishes the true
wrong-doer rather than the prosecutor whtii 1 lwauthority over the
conduct of police officers. 275
Furthermore, since this reform would/guyject iviolating officers
to sanctions, it serves as a more effectiv‘ tjeterrint of illegal police
activity."' Law enforcement officials could no longer conduct violative
searches knowing that the subject of the searches possesses no remedy
if the case does not go to trial."' Finally, the awarding of damages, both
actual and punitive, would offer a much more proportionate response
than the mechanistic suppression of any tainted evidence."'
Despite these attractions, the Violent Crime Control Act also con-
tains several potential flaws. The deterrence obtained by such a reform
would only result from the regular imposition of sanctions upon of-
fending officers combined with fair and adequate compensation to
victims for their illegal acts."' If judges or juries will not look past the
unattractiveness of the complainant and show a willingness to punish
law enforcement officials and compensate even convicted parties, then
such a proposal offers no real deterrence. 28° Currently, however, judges
effectively exclude tainted evidence from trial, knowing that the sup-
27 ' See Janis, 428 U.S. at 458 n.35.
272 See id. at 449-50.
273 See S. 3, § 507.
274 See id. It should he noted, however, that the act severely restricts the remedy available to




278 See S. 3, § 507.
279 See Stewart, so/sea note 20, at 1387.
250
 See id.
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pression of this evidence may result in the release of a guilty party. 281
Nothing suggests, therefore, that judges could not be entrusted with
the power to award actual damages to an accused while permitting the
prosecution to continue. In fact, such a reform might more effectively
deter illegal conduct as judges would be more inclined to provide
compensation than exclude the reliable evidence because such a ail-
ing would not result in the release of an apparently guilty party.
The issue of sanctioning offending officers, however, poses greater
problems. The Violent Crime Control Act entrusts the agency that
employs the offending officer with the power to determine an appro-
priate punishment. 282
 The notion of an agency, especially in a competi-
tive area such as law enforcement, disciplining overzealous officers
produces a fair amount of skepticism, and rightfully so. Trials by jury,
an alternative proposal, are unlikely to result in the more frequent
punishment of guilty officers. 283 An additional alternative, punishments
determined by an administrative judge or magistrate, might result in
more frequent punishments but also raises budgetary concerns, per-
haps even including the creation of an additional federal agency. 284
The imposition of increased liability on the United States pro-
duces a final problem with Senator Dole's proposal. Increasing the
liability of the federal government would result in moderate to large
payments by the federal government to violated parties. Although such
an increase in expenditures by the federal government for this purpose
might merely represent the cost of waging the war on crime, taking on
additional liability nonetheless appears imprudent, especially during
times of a budgetary crisis.
Due to the problems that may result from the passage of the
Violent Crime Control Act, Congress should pass, with some modi-
fications, the Exclusionary Rule Reform Act and thus create a good
faith exception to the exclusionary rule for warrantless searches. 285
Although such a reform would not necessarily answer the criticisms of
the exclusionary rule as effectively as the Violent Crime Control Act,
it also would not produce as many new concerns. 2" Therefore, the
Exclusionary Rule Reform Act represents an intermediate step, per-
mitting the conviction of criminals by the admission of unintentionally
281
 See Evans, 115 S. Ct. at 1193.
282 S. 3, § 507.
288 See Stewart, supra note 20, at 1387-88.
284 See S. 3, § 507.
285 See H.R. (156, 104th Cong. (1995).
286 See id.
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tainted evidence while still deterring illegal police conduct without
increasing federal expenditures. 287
Because it applies only to acts conducted in good faith, this ex-
ception preserves the current deterrent value of the exclusionary
rule.288 The prosecution may admit evidence at trial only if the seizing
officer believed his actions complied with the Fourth Amendment and
that belief was reasonable. 2" Because a judge will not admit evidence
that results from searches that the officer knew, or should have known,
violated the Constitution, such a reform does not produce any in-
creased incentive for an officer to engage in illegal activity. 29" The
exclusionary rule, therefore, would still serve to deter illegal police
conduct without increasing the financial burden of the federal govern-
ment.
Although the Exclusionary Rule Reform Act does not respond to
the criticisms of the exclusionary rule as effectively as the Violent
Crime Control Act, it does answer the most important criticisms. Still,
this proposal does not resolve many of the problems of the exclusion-
ary rule. For instance, this reform still provides no remedy for innocent
subjects of illegal searches beyond those provided for under a § 1983
suit. Under this reform, however, criminals no longer benefit from
innocent, although illegal, searches. 29 ' This proposal, thus, reforms
the most damaging flaw of the current application of the exclusion-
ary rule.
Despite the appropriateness of this reform, Congress must modify
the Exclusionary Rule Reform Act before its final passage. As it cur-
rently exists, the proposed Act does not extend the good faith excep-
tion for warrantless searches to the ATF or the IRS. 292 Other than
election politics, there lacks a justification for this distinction between
federal agencies. 2" Before its final passage, therefore, Congress should
extend the good faith exception to all federal agencies as well as to
local agencies who obtain evidence for use in federal court.
V. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, Congress should follow through on promised re-
form of the exclusionary rule. The exclusionary rule continues to
287 Compare EI,R. 666 with S.3, § 507.
288 See Leon, 468 U.S. at 919-20.
289 See H.R. 666, § 2(a).
290 See id.
29t Id.
292 	§ 2(d), (e).
293 See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
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deter some illegal police activity and, therefore, Congress should not
repeal the doctrine entirely. 294 Blanket application of this mechanistic
remedy, however, too frequently produces unjust results, and Congress
must reform its flaws. 295
 The Exclusionary Rule Reform Act most effec-
tively remedies the problems inherent in this imperfect doctrine; thus,
with minor modification, Congress should approve this bill.
The Supreme Court will probably uphold these proposed correc-
tive measures under the Exclusionary Rule Reform Act because they
would not result in a reduced deterrent effect.299 The Supreme Court
recognized over two decades ago that the Fourth Amendment does not
mandate suppression of tainted evidence in all instances. 297
 In sub-
sequent decisions, the Supreme Court has reduced the policies behind
this doctrine to a single justification: deterrence of illegal police activ-
ity. 29s The proposed congressional reforms would not further encour-
age such activities; thus, the Supreme Court would probably uphold
these modifications as constitutional and consistent with the protec-
tions afforded by the Fourth Amendment. 299
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